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Abstract: 
Most of the European Member States employ anti-loss trafficking rules. They aim to prevent the acqui-
sition of mere corporate shells with high tax loss carryforwards for the tax asset to be utilized in profit-
able companies. However, other corporations can unintentionally be affected by the anti-abuse regula-
tions if there is a change in ownership or activity. The transfer restrictions have been argued to impair 
start-up financing, as investors are faced with the risk of losing accumulated loss carryforwards in the 
corporation upon the entering of new or the capital increase of existing investors. 
This study provides an overview over the design and development of loss transfer restrictions in the 
EU28 over a time period of 19 years (2000 – 2018). Different aspects of the regulations are analyzed 
against the background of their impact on start-ups. Finally, the rules are categorized with respect to 
their strictness. Over time, more countries introduced restrictions. At the same time, the regulations 
became more lenient, offering start-ups more opportunities to maintain their loss carryforwards and, 
therefore, decreasing the risk for investors. 
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1. Introduction 
Loss trafficking, i.e. the acquisition of shell companies with significant tax loss carryforwards 
but without any economic activity for no other purpose than the transfer of tax loss carryfor-
wards, is widely deemed abusive. The majority of the European Member States have anti-loss 
trafficking restrictions in place to counter such transactions, relying on criteria such as a change 
in ownership or activity. The reasoning behind it relates to the notion that decision-making 
should not be (exclusively) motivated by tax considerations. However, the reliance on general 
criteria to identify so-deemed abusive deals has the potential to affect other transactions as well. 
Economically, these restrictions result in external investors not being able to offset their losses. 
Being forced to forfeit loss carryforwards means losing a tax shield that could have led to sub-
stantial tax savings in the future, thus reducing the value of the corporation. As a result, denying 
the transfer of loss carryforwards could entice investors to refrain from funding risky projects. 
External financing is particularly important for start-ups, since they are often financially con-
strained. They have not yet been able to build up financial reserves and do only have insufficient 
collateral to obtain bank credits (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002b, 2002a; Cosh, Cumming, & 
Hughes, 2009; Da Rin, Nicodano, & Sembenelli, 2006). Small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are an important part of the economy, accounting for almost 100% of businesses in the 
European Union (EU) and providing a considerable portion of overall employment (European 
Commission, 2018). Especially innovative start-ups are considered an important driver of in-
novation. Fostering an attractive environment for entrepreneurship is therefore important for a 
country’s economy and advancement. Restricting the possibilities to offset losses and, as a re-
sult, increasing the risk for investors could jeopardize this goal. Possible negative effects could 
entail difficulties to obtain start-up financing or disincentives to go public. 
The objective of this study is firstly to examine anti-tax loss trafficking rules across the EU28 
Member States from 2000 to 2018. While temporal restrictions on losses such as tax loss car-
rybacks and carryforwards have already been investigated in the theoretical and empirical lit-
erature, this study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to provide a comprehensive over-
view over restrictions of the transfer of tax loss carryforwards and their development over time. 
The regulations concern a narrow part of corporate tax law and are, if even mentioned, only 
described on a very general basis in tax databases commonly used in research. The data was 
collected using tax guides, supplemented by other studies and appended by referring directly to 
national tax law. The design of anti-tax loss trafficking rules is heterogeneous across the EU28 
Member States, with a wide range of conditions and exceptions. Therefore, in a second part, 
the restrictions will be categorized to construct a more comparable variable. The strictness of 
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anti-tax loss trafficking regulations could influence the decision-making of founders and inves-
tors, thus impacting the attractiveness of the EU28 Member States (as well as the EU as a whole) 
as a location for innovative businesses. The results can provide guidance for policy makers by 
giving them the opportunity to explore alternative designs enacted in other countries. Investors 
can compare the ranking of the different regulations and their restrictiveness in the EU28 Mem-
ber States that are of interest to them. The newly created variable can also be used for future 
research on the topic. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the 
treatment of tax losses with a focus on adverse effects it could potentially have on start-up 
development. Chapter 3 discusses the reasoning behind restrictions of tax loss transfers. Chap-
ter 4 reviews empirical literature in the field. Chapter 5 examines different aspects of anti-tax 
loss trafficking regulations across the EU28 Member States. Chapter 6 categorizes the regula-
tions. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes. 
2.  Start-ups and tax loss restrictions 
While a lot of public attention and research focuses on multinational corporations, SMEs ac-
count for a considerable part of the economic activity and growth. According to the 2018 annual 
report on European SMEs, they significantly contributed to the recovery after the financial cri-
sis. 99.8% of non-financial businesses in the EU are categorized as SMEs, providing 66.4% of 
overall employment in the sector (European Commission, 2018). Young and innovative com-
panies are considered the driver of a country’s technological and economic progress. 
Start-ups often suffer from credit constraints as they lack sufficient collateral (Carpenter & 
Petersen, 2002b, 2002a; Cosh et al., 2009; Da Rin et al., 2006). Market failures such as 
externalities and information asymmetries aggravate this problem (Mina, Lahr, & Hughesy, 
2013, Crawford & Freedman, 2010), leading to suboptimal investment in innovative projects 
(García-Quevedo, Segarra-Blasco, & Teruel, 2018). Venture capital (VC) funds bridge the 
funding gap with private equity. They typically support innovative ventures in their start-up 
phase and aim to exit after a number of years, mostly via a sale of the start-up or an initial public 
offering (IPO) (Schwienbacher, 2008). Apart from the loosening of financing constraints, ven-
ture capitalists provide additional support and guidance to start-ups, helping them to realize 
their full potential (Da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2013; Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Lerner, 1994). 
Therefore a vital VC market plays an important role in the development of start-ups and inno-
vation. 
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In their initial stage, most start-ups invest into their projects without generating corresponding 
income, resulting in an overall loss (EY, 2013). Losses are treated asymmetrically for tax pur-
poses. While profits are taxed immediately, losses can only be deducted against past (loss car-
ryback) or future profits (loss carryforward), often subject to temporal or relative constraints.  
If the tax code allows for loss carrybacks, the taxpayer can offset current losses with past profits 
and claim a tax refund or tax credit. Remaining losses are to be carried forward and can be 
offset against future profits. Depending on the national regulations (see Bräutigam, Spengel and 
Stutzenberger (Bräutigam, Spengel, & Stutzenberger, 2017) for an overview), loss carrybacks 
as well as carryforwards can be limited in time or amount. Some countries limit the deductible 
amount to a percentage of the current income or a percentage of the total amount of loss car-
ryforwards, others provide absolute thresholds, or a combination of both. Losses are usually 
carried forward at their nominal value, i.e. they are not adjusted for inflation or the time value 
of money. Therefore, unused losses effectively loose in economic value the longer they are 
carried forward. These loss regulations alone already discriminate against start-up investment, 
as the loss relief cannot be immediately claimed. Instead, in contrast to mature firms that can 
consolidate with other investments that already generate positive taxable income, start-ups have 
to wait until their project turns profitable to be able to benefit from accumulated losses (Craw-
ford & Freedman, 2010). 
Besides temporal restrictions on the offset of losses within a company, another important aspect 
of tax loss provisions concerns the transfer of losses between incorporated entities. Anti-loss 
trafficking rules can lead to the forfeiture of accumulated loss carryforwards in certain cases, 
such as a change in activity or a change in ownership (for more details, please refer to chapter 
5). While these regulations are designed as anti-abuse measures to prevent the tax-driven ac-
quisition of loss-making companies without any real activities, it has been argued that they 
distort investment, especially in case of start-up financing.  
The above-mentioned tax loss provisions might prevent investors from funding start-up re-
search and development (R&D) expenditure if – due to the regulations potentially worthless – 
losses have accumulated (Haufler, Norbäck, & Persson, 2014). First, loss transfer restrictions 
might negatively affect the financing decision of investors. Considering that the expenditure 
might not be tax-deductible later on, they might decide to forego or reduce the investment in a 
start-up. Second, they might also decrease the probability and price of acquisitions or IPOs in 
the exit case. Corporations could be reluctant to go public if, due to the change in the ownership 
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structure after an exit, anti-loss trafficking rules might apply. Depending on the specific regu-
lation, the loss carryforwards accumulated in the start-up cannot be used at all, or with strict 
limitations.  
The potential distortions caused by tax loss restrictions likely differ in their severity depending 
on the design of the regulation. If investors and founders take anti-tax loss trafficking regula-
tions into account when deciding where to locate and invest, the restrictions have real economic 
consequences. 
An exception to the denial of loss transfer between different corporate entities are group taxa-
tion regimes, where loss offset is allowed within a controlled group of companies via consoli-
dation or loss compensation payments. However, as this study focuses on SMEs und start-ups 
outside of corporate groups, group taxation schemes will not be considered here. 
3.   Reasoning behind anti-tax loss transfer regulations 
Reasons often brought forward to argue for the restriction of tax loss transfers relate to the 
notion that only the person incurring the tax loss should reap its benefits (Donnelly & Young, 
2002; Hoenig, 2014; Nijhawan, 2015). However, pressing for the forced forfeiture of tax loss 
carryforwards after a change in ownership ignores that the denial may well lead to the new 
shareholders not being able to use the loss carryforwards, but it also denies the off-set for the 
old shareholders. Investors are thus not compensated for the investment they lost. As a result, 
the regulation aiming to restrict the benefits of loss carryforwards to its so-deemed rightful 
owner ends up denying the deduction altogether.  
It is also voiced that it should only be allowed to set off losses if the activity that gave rise to 
them is continued (Hoenig, 2014; Nijhawan, 2015; Poitevin, 2003). The restriction to a similar 
or the same activity is said to encourage a corporation to continue loss-making activities in 
order to maintain loss carryforwards (Hoenig, 2014). According to Nijhawan (2015), this in-
centive is not set if the restriction not just requires the activity to be continued, but also allows 
the set-off of loss carryforwards only against profits from said activity. However, Hoenig (2014) 
states that, considering other regulations in tax law, it seems arbitrary to restrict the use of loss 
carryforwards to activities that gave rise to it while a taxpayer’s income is usually calculated 
based on the net of  all of his activities. 
One of the major arguments alleged for the regulations relates to the principle of tax neutrality. 
The principle requires that taxes do not affect decision-making. Denying the transfer of losses 
is argued to prevent transactions which are driven entirely by tax considerations and do not 
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have any real economic reason other than the offset of losses. Even so, the allowance of tax loss 
carryforwards itself is borne out of efforts to mitigate the asymmetric treatment of profits and 
losses. The forfeiture of tax loss carryforwards thus does not improve but impair the neutrality 
of the tax system. Additionally, Poitevin (2003) brings forward the argument that, if loss car-
ryforwards are transferable, firms in financial distress can use them as a collateral to obtain 
external financing, reducing imperfections in financial markets. Secondly, Hoenig (2014) calls 
in question why tax-driven transactions should even be considered undesirable in the context 
of loss trafficking. He points out that it should not make a difference whether a corporation’s 
shareholders recoup their suffered losses by setting them off themselves ore being compensated 
through acquisition prices. That said, while it is at a state’s discretion to circumvent transactions 
that are deemed to be abusive, trade sales and public offers of start-ups will generally not fulfill 
this scope, but they can still be affected by the restrictions. 
Denying the use of loss carryforward transfers introduces distortions due to its limitation to 
corporations. In partnerships, the transparency principle leads to the apportionment of losses to 
the respective partners; they can be set off against other income of the individuals. In corpora-
tions, the separation principle causes the loss to be trapped at the level of the corporation; the 
shareholders are unable to utilize it outside of the corporate sphere. Due to the transfer re-
striction, they are not even able to be compensated for the losses after the sale of the corporation, 
leading to asymmetric distribution of risk between partnerships and corporations. In partner-
ships, investors are able to set off the resulting tax loss carryforwards against profits from other 
investments if the company is unsuccessful. In corporations, the investment is ultimately lost if 
the start-up is not turning profitable.  
All in all, while anti-loss trafficking rules targeted at the so-deemed abusive transfer of tax loss 
carryforwards can, unintentionally, negatively affect corporate start-ups. Most companies seek-
ing external finance will choose to incorporate (Crawford & Freedman, 2010). Restricting the 
transfer of loss carryforwards increases the risk for investor and discriminates against corporate 
start-ups, thus possibly leading to distortions in financing, legal form and location decisions. 
Seedtable’s list of “100 European Start-ups to watch in 2019”1 is comprised entirely of corpo-
rations, indicating a substantial share of incorporated entities in the European high-tech start-
up ecosystem and therefore a potentially high relevance of loss transfer restrictions. 
                                                            
1 Seedtable, https://www.seedtable.com/startups-europe (09.09.2019). 
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4. Empirical evidence 
To the best of our knowledge there exists no empirical study investigating the effect of anti-tax 
loss trafficking rules. There is, however, an increasing literature relating to the effects of tem-
poral loss restrictions such as tax loss carrybacks and carryforwards. 
It has been shown that the permission of loss carrybacks, i.e. the loosening of tax loss re-
strictions, can lead to overinvestment and delay the exit of unprofitable firms (Bethmann, Jacob, 
& Muller, 2018). Similarly, the existence of loss carryforwards (Auerbach & Poterba, 1987) 
and the limitation of carryforward periods, i.e. the tightening of tax loss restrictions, has been 
shown to decrease investment incentives (Dreßler & Overesch, 2013). Dreßler and Overesch 
(2013) refrain from clearly arguing for or against temporal loss restrictions due to negative 
investment effects in case of restrictive regulations on the one hand and potential distortions of 
competition in case of generous regulations on the other hand.  
Strict tax regulations concerning losses also negatively impact the perception of risk. Haufler, 
Norbäck and Persson (2014) model the effect of limited loss offset provisions on the riskiness 
of projects and find risk-reducing effects, i.e. the tax policy discourages inventors from starting 
risky ventures. Several empirical studies confirm that stricter tax loss provisions have a negative 
effect on risk-taking (Langenmayr & Lester, 2018; Sureth-Sloane & Mehrmann, 2017). 
Focusing on start-ups, Mintz (1988) finds that, due to the uncertainty of the future profits and 
concomitant uncertainty about the value of current losses, they face a significantly higher po-
tential tax rate than other firms in the same industry. In a subsequent paper, Cooper and Knittel 
(2010) add to those results. When comparing new to established firms, on average the results 
show higher losses and lower loss utilization rates as well as higher expected tax rates. They 
conclude that especially new firms and certain industries are disproportionally affected by the 
negative effects of asymmetric tax loss treatment. Due to their inability to immediately pool tax 
losses with profitable projects, start-ups face a far higher risk of not being able to deduct their 
investments (Henrekson & Sanandaji, 2011). Similarly, other research shows that especially 
small companies that would be eligible for loss offset do not claim their refund due to tax com-
plexity (Zwick, 2018).  
Taken together, the empirical literature suggests that tax loss regulations matter, and they matter 
more for young compared to mature companies. While more restrictive loss provisions might 
reduce overinvestment and mitigate concerns with respect to the delayed exit of unprofitable 
companies, they discriminate against risky investments. This disproportionally hits small and 
newly established firms. Transferring the conclusions drawn in the area of temporal tax loss 
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restrictions to anti-tax loss trafficking rules, the possible distortions addressed in the previous 
chapter are likely to predominantly affect SMEs and start-ups. 
5. Transfer of tax losses in the EU28 Member States 
The majority of EU28 Member States have introduced specific anti-abuse rules targeting so-
deemed abusive transfer of tax losses. While the design of the national regulations shows great 
heterogeneity across countries, they share similar elements.2 Estonia and Latvia occupy a spe-
cial position due to the unique features of their tax law. Corporate taxes are only levied on profit 
distributions; tax loss carryforwards or carrybacks are not relevant in this system. 
5.1. Change in ownership 
A change in shareholding can trigger the anti-abuse regulation. As such, the regulation only 
concerns acquisitions conducted as share deals; in asset deals, the tax loss carryforwards gen-
erally remain with the corporation that incurred the loss. If the restrictions are tied to changes 
in shareholding, not just the sale of the corporation but any substantial investment resulting in 
a change in the ownership structure could pose a threat to accumulated loss carryforwards 
within a start-up. 
 
Figure 1: Definition of change in ownership (in 2018) 
                                                            
2 The data was collected using the IBFD Country Analyses, a number of tax guides (PwC, EY, KPMG), various other references (BDI & 
KPMG, 2011; OECD, 2011) and, as most information was available on a broad basis only, by referring directly to the national tax law. A 
detailed overview of the elements of the national restrictions can be found in the appendix. 
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What constitutes a harmful change in ownership differs depending on the national regulation 
(Figure 1). While seven of the EU28 Member States that rely on this criteria refer to changes in 
control or majority (commonly assumed to be fulfilled upon the transfer of more than 50% of 
a company’s shares), others clearly specify minimum thresholds ranging from of 25% (e.g. 
Czech Republic) to 75% (e.g. Austria). Just three countries employ the anti-abuse rules already 
for change in ownership below 50%.  
The German regulations in place since 2008 lead to the pro rata denial of loss carryforwards 
upon a change in ownership between 25 and 50% and a full denial from 50%. However, in 2017 
the German Federal Constitutional Court has declared the pro rata regulations unconstitutional 
(Decision from 29.3.2017, 2 BvL 6/11). 
 
Figure 2: Type of ownership (in 2018) 
The notion of ownership differs between the EU28 Member States (Figure 2). The share of 
equity, voting and dividend rights can coincide, but different share classes or voting agreements 
can lead to different distributions of types of holdings of a company. The majority of the EU28 
Member States exclusively refers to a change in ownership in equity rights (e.g. Finland), others 
to changes in the share of voting rights (e.g. Italy). However, it is possible that administrative 
practice extends the concept of ownership to prevent circumventions of the tax law. The word-
ing of the tax law in some Member States covers changes in both types of ownership (e.g. 
Greece). Germany and Spain are the only two countries that also include changes in the rights 
for dividends as a possible trigger. 
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Apart from the acquisition of emitted shares of a company, increases in share capital with a 
concomitant change in the ownership structure can also potentially lead to the forfeiture of tax 
loss carryforwards. This explicitly applies in Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
For start-ups, this restriction could be harmful in the funding process as the entrance of every 
new investor could already lead to the extinguishment of loss carryforwards.   
5.2. Change in activity 
While some countries did or do only rely on the ownership criteria, several countries require a 
change in activity in addition to a change in ownership for the restriction to apply. France and 
Portugal occupy a special position as they do not require a change in ownership, but instead 
deem a change in activity already as sufficient to deny the deduction of tax loss carryforwards. 
The forced forfeiture of losses after a change in activity can have serious negative consequences, 
especially in the initial stages where the development of a business plan might lead to the shift 
of the company’s economic focus.  
The definition of a change in activity differs across countries. In general, the regulations can be 
sub-divided into three groups (Figure 3): Five of the Member States refer to financial statement 
figures, sometimes having detailed thresholds requiring the company to maintain certain per-
centages of assets and employees for a minimum time period or a certain level of turnover 
generated by the company’s activities. Four countries depend on the commercial orientation of 
the company, defining changes in product portfolio or targeted sales markets as a change in 
activity. Seven generally refer to a continuation of the activity or nature of the original trade as 
necessary requirement to maintain loss carryforwards. 
In the Czech Republic, the company has to prove that at least 80% of its revenue is generated 
by the same activity that was conducted during the time the tax losses in question were assessed, 
otherwise a harmful change in activity is assumed. Spain links it to different or an additional 
group of activities (based on the national classification of economic activities) that generate 
revenue exceeding 50% of the average turnover of the previous two years. France and Greece 
rely on changes in turnover of more than 50% compared to the preceding year due to additional 
or ceased activities, with France allowing the average number of employees and the gross value 
of fixed assets as alternative criteria. The Netherlands define a harmful change in activity as a 
decrease in the original activities to less than 30%. Relevant factors to determine the activity of 
a corporation depend on the industry and include employment, turnover and assets. 
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Figure 3: Definition of change in activity (in 2018) 
To capture the commercial orientation of the corporation, services, products sold, sales market 
targeted, and customer relationships are considered. In Germany, the activities since the foun-
dation of the company or at least the previous three years are taken as benchmark. If losses are 
carried over based on the activity exemption, loss carryforwards can be offset as long as the 
activities are continued. If the activity requirement ceases to be fulfilled, remaining loss car-
ryforwards are forfeited. Great Britain also takes the three years before the change in activity 
into consideration, but limits the relevant time after the change in ownership to five years. Hun-
gary requires the continuation of the company’s activities for at least two years with the gener-
ation of corresponding revenue. Ireland defines a change in activity as harmful if it occurs 
within a three-year-period of the change in ownership. 
5.3 Exemptions  
5.3.1 Overview 
To ensure that the anti-loss trafficking restrictions affect cases that are considered abusive but 
exclude transactions that are not targeted, regulators have introduced exemptions for specific 
cases (Figure 4). These escape clauses will be discussed in detail in the following sub-chapters. 
Overall, exemptions are provided for reorganizations in response to financial distress or the 
availability of hidden reserves. Transactions within groups where the ultimate owner remains 
can be disregarded, too, as well as changes in the ownership structure of quoted companies. 
Some countries provide the opportunity to bring forward evidence of economic and financial 
reasons to refute the abuse assumption. The regulations mentioned are explicitly stated in the 
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respective EU Member States’ tax law. In addition, some EU Member States could employ 
exemptions based on administrative directives or more informal practices.                                                                                                                 
 
Figure 4: Explicit exemptions (in 2018) 
5.3.2 Recovery 
Austria and Germany implemented the so-called “Sanierungsklausel” (recovery clause) in their 
regulations, which allows the transfer of losses, even if the requirements of the anti-loss traf-
ficking rules have been fulfilled, in case of reorganizations to save the company. The reorgan-
ization has to aim to safeguard a substantial part of the jobs (Austria) and to maintain the com-
pany’s main business structures (Germany). Similarly, Croatia and Slovenia do not apply the 
regulation if the change in activity results from efforts to maintain employment and to finan-
cially recover the company. In Finland, special permission to utilize loss carryforwards is 
granted upon application if it is necessary for the continuation of the company’s business. One 
of the reasons accepted are reorganizations, where the effects on employment are also of im-
portance. 
Taken together, the exemptions for recovery display similar features. One shared objective is 
the safeguard of jobs, where the specific demands tied to this aim can differ between the coun-
tries depending on the wording of the regulation and administrative practice. 
5.3.3 Hidden reserves 
After criticism from the industry as well as the scientific community regarding the excessive 
nature of its anti-loss trafficking regulation, Germany added exceptions, amongst them the so-
called hidden reserve clause. It allows the transfer of loss carryforwards up to the amount of 
hidden reserves in case of a change in ownership. While the German wording simply demands 
the presence of hidden reserves, Austria explicitly requires their disclosure (leading to a tax-
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Recovery
5 countries
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effective step-up). Similarly, the Netherlands allow step-ups in the book value of the company’s 
assets to utilize otherwise lost loss carryforwards. In France, changes in the activity of accom-
pany lead to a fictive liquidation of the company. As a consequence, hidden reserves incorpo-
rated in the companies assets can be revealed and set off against loss carryforwards. While this 
treatment does not offer the possibility to maintain loss carryforwards after the activity and 
business purpose of a company has changed, they are not lost per se. As in the Austrian case, 
capital gains obtained by tax-effective step-ups can be set off against the accumulated loss car-
ryforwards. Sweden allows the deduction of losses up to double the purchase price (reduced by 
related capital contributions) of the transferred shares. If the purchase price greatly exceeds the 
value of the loss carryforward it is presumed that the price compensates for hidden reserves, 
negating the abuse assumption (BDI & KPMG, 2011). 
5.3.4 Quoted companies 
Quoted companies have limited influence on the trading of their shares on public stock markets. 
They often do not know when a relevant change in ownership occurs that could affect their 
existing loss carryforwards. Four countries account for the difficulties in tracking the ownership 
structure of widely held public companies and include an exemption in their tax law. 
Denmark and Hungary exclude listed companies in general from the scope of the anti-loss traf-
ficking restrictions. Finland exempts listed companies to the extent that their shares are traded 
on a regulated market, i.e. only changes in non-listed shares can lead to the forfeiture of losses. 
In the Netherlands, the regulations include a provision according to which regular trading does 
not lead to an extinction of loss carryforwards, as long as the company could not have known 
that a significant change in ownership took place. 
5.3.5 Groups 
Restructuring within a group might result in a change in the direct ownership structure while 
the ultimate holding remains unaffected. Such transactions are excluded from the scope of the 
anti-avoidance regulations in nine countries. What constitutes a group differs from country to 
country. 
The German “Konzernklausel” (group clause) restricts the application of the anti-abuse clause 
to changes with less than 100% direct or indirect shareholding chains. Great Britain, Ireland 
and Cyprus just require a 75% ownership relation for the non-application. The Dutch fiscal 
authorities do not apply the restrictions on loss carryforwards if the harmful change in owner-
ship can be attributed to a shareholder that, directly or indirectly, already held at least one third 
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of the shares before the transaction. Similarly, in Finland changes within the ownership struc-
ture of a group are amongst the reasons accepted to obtain permission to use loss carryforwards. 
A company belongs to a group if a limited company exercises dominant influence over it, usu-
ally determined based on the absolute voting majority. Italy also relies on the concept of control, 
regularly achieved by direct or indirect holdings in excess of 50% of the share capital. 
In Sweden and Denmark, changes of ownership are determined at the parent level. Therefore, 
restructuring within a group does not trigger the regulation as long as it does not affect the 
ultimate share holding. Swedish groups are build by decisive influence over other companies, 
typically achieved by holding more than half of the voting rights or otherwise exerting control. 
Denmark only requires a minimum shareholding of 25%. In those cases, solely changes in own-
ership of the ultimate parent results in the forfeiture of loss carryforwards. 
5.3.6 Evidence of economic and financial justifications 
Five countries explicitly provide the opportunity to justify changes in the ownership structure 
or activity. Belgium refers to legitimate reasons of financial or economic nature, Finland to a 
necessity for the continuation of the company’s business. In Portugal, a request can be made to 
the Ministry of Finance (before changes in ownership or activity triggering the regulation take 
place) in special cases of economic interest. Sweden may grant exemptions if the change in 
ownership has socio-economic significance and would not take place if the exemption would 
not be granted. However, this option is applied very restrictively. 
5.3.7 Relevance of exemptions for start-ups 
The exemptions summarized above apply to companies of all sizes and ages. One major reason 
for the re-introduction of the activity criteria in Germany in 2016 was the relief of restrictions 
on start-ups (Berger & Tetzlaff, 2019). However, the wording of the tax law now includes all 
companies to avoid illegal state aid cases. Similarly, to the best of our knowledge, none of the 
EU28 Member States, except for Italy, employs exemptions specifically limited to start-ups. 
Since 2017, young Italian companies have the possibility to transfer all tax losses incurred in 
their first three fiscal years of activity to a listed corporation that has at least 20% shareholding 
in the start-up. The price paid to the start-up for the transferred loss carryforwards is not in-
cluded in its taxable income, i.e. it is received tax-free. Other than that, start-ups have to rely 
on the general rules to utilize their loss carryforwards.  
The exemptions for recovery, quoted companies and groups will regularly be of little relevance 
to start-ups. While they are often financially constraint, changes in ownership or activity do not 
occur due to financial distress but are part of strategic decisions in the development process of 
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the start-up. Privately held start-ups cannot make use of the exclusion of listed corporations. In 
addition, start-ups that have been established independently will not benefit from the group 
exemption. While there are start-ups that have been founded as a spin-off of a regular company 
and are thus part of a corporate group, this particular group will not be as dependent on external 
investors as they can rely on funding from within their group. 
While the hidden reserve clauses seem, at first glance, beneficial for start-ups, their applicability 
is limited. Hidden reserves are commonly defined as the difference between book and market 
value tied to material or immaterial business assets of the company. Start-ups that have yet not 
been able to build up any hidden reserves on their assets will not be able to exploit the exemp-
tion. The determination and pricing of self-generated goodwill will prove to be difficult, if at 
all accepted as hidden reserve within the meaning of the national law. Sweden’s amount limi-
tation rule provides leeway in a sense that hidden reserves do not have to be realized per se, but 
instead are assumed to be compensated for in the purchase price.   
For start-ups without the ability to set off hidden reserves, the remaining option is to bring 
forward evidence of financial and economic reasons to refute the abuse assumption. This entails 
administrative efforts and therefore costs that are imposed on the company. 
6. Categorization of anti-loss trafficking regulations 
As apparent from the preceding overview, the design of the regulations varies greatly across 
the EU28 Member States. Despite this heterogeneity, a classification into broad categories can 
be undertaken based on the strictness of the regulations. The easier it is to maintain loss car-
ryforwards despite changes in activity or ownership, the more lenient the restriction.  
The absence of anti-loss trafficking rules is classified as the most lenient Category 0. In those 
cases, there is no explicitly codified restriction on the deduction of tax loss carryforwards after 
a change in ownership or activity. 
In case of explicit regulations, abuse is blanketly assumed based on codified criteria. The bur-
den of proof of the opposite rests upon the taxpayer. In those cases, the cumulative requirement 
of a change in activity and ownership is the least restrictive measure. As both criteria have to 
be fulfilled, the forfeiture of loss carryforwards can be avoided if the start-up’s business activity 
is maintained (and properly documented) for the required periods, even if a new investor enters 
or existing investors increase their stake in the enterprise. On the other hand, an adjustment in 
the business strategy to account for changing preferences or to gain access to a new customer 
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base will not lead to unintended negative tax consequences if it does not coincide with a change 
in the ownership structure.   
The forfeiture of losses after a change in activity imposes a more serious restriction on start-
ups than the cumulative requirement. Nevertheless, as summarized in chapter 5.2, most coun-
tries rely on broad definitions of a corporation’s activity. While this lack of guidance may lead 
to legal uncertainty, it also gives corporations leeway in avoiding the application of the re-
striction. Changes in activity will generally have to be far reaching in order to trigger the regu-
lations. As long as the corporation maintains its activities, investments, trade sales and IPOs do 
not lead to the forfeiture of loss carryforwards. 
Compared to activity-based clauses, anti-abuse regulations solely relying on a change in own-
ership are more restrictive. Within this category, any substantial investment (and in some coun-
tries, even a capital increase from existing shareholders) could pose a threat to accumulated loss 
carryforwards within a start-up. If the corporation plans to go public, they will have to take into 
account the value of its accumulated loss carryforwards that will be lost in the process. The 
precisely defined thresholds do not leave any room for interpretation once they have been 
crossed.  
Anti-abuse regulations either relying on a change in ownership or a change in activity fall in 
the most restrictive category. The fulfillment of each criteria on its own (and, of course, if they 
are reached cumulatively) leads to the forfeiture of a corporation’s loss carryforwards.  
Based on this reasoning, four categories are defined as follows: 
Table 1: Categories of anti-loss trafficking rules 
Category Description 
Category 0 No explicit anti-loss trafficking rule 
Category 1 Denial of loss transfer after change in ownership and activity 
(cumulative requirement) 
Category 2 Denial of loss transfer after change in activity 
Category 3 Denial of loss transfer after change in ownership 
Category 4 Denial of loss transfer after change in ownership or activity 
(fulfillment of one criteria sufficient) 
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Other elements that could be used to categorize the regulations have been discussed in chapter 
5. However, a more fine-grained classification would inflate the number of categories and de-
feat the purpose of such a measure. Instead, the other elements could be included in an empirical 
specification as separate variables. 
Table 2 depicts the categorization of the loss carryforward restrictions for the EU28 Member 
States. 17 out of the 28 countries considered had anti-loss trafficking rules in place since before 
2000, with the rules being introduced around the 80s and 90s. This entailed the majority of the 
EU15 countries (except Greece and Luxembourg), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary and Latvia. 
Ownership-based system were enacted in slightly more countries compared to cumulative re-
gimes (eight compared to seven); two countries had an activity-based scheme in place.  
17 of the EU28 Member States did not change their regulations since 2000. Amongst them, six 
never introduced regulations and thus fall in Category 0 (Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic); Category 1 and Category 3 fill five countries each (Austria, Cyprus, 
England, Ireland and Italy in Category 1, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden in 
Category 3). France with its activity-based rule is the only one placed in the second category. 
Over the course of the time period considered here, five countries, mainly Eastern Member 
States around their accession to the EU, newly introduced restrictions (Czech Republic, Greece, 
Croatia, Lithuania, Slovenia), mostly relying on cumulative criteria. Merely Slovenia intro-
duced an ownership-based system, placing it in Category 3. However, it quickly changed to a 
cumulative regime after two years, consequently dropping to Category 1. Five countries 
changed existing regulations (Germany, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia). The majority in-
troduced the activity-requirement in addition to the ownership criteria and moved from the third 
to the first category. Germany switched its system in 2008, changing from the first to the third 
category, but later re-introduced the additional activity requirement. Portugal added the owner-
ship criteria to the activity criteria as mutually exclusive condition, thus dropping from Cate-
gory 2 to 4. In contrast, just two countries abolished the restriction: Hungary had an ownership-
based system in place in 2000, abolished it in 2001 and over a decade later re-introduced a 
cumulative system. Latvia switch to a corporate tax system levying taxes on distributions, thus 
rendering loss carryforwards (and therefore anti-tax loss trafficking rules) irrelevant.  
As of 2018, only Luxembourg, Poland, Latvia, Malta, Romania and the Slovak Republic remain 
without anti-abuse rules targeted at the transfer of loss carryforwards. . 
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Table 2: Category Allocation to the EU28 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
AT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
BG 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
CY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CZ 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 
DK 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 
FI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
FR 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
GB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HU 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LT 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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LV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NL 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
SI 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Notes: 
EE (2000-2018): taxation of profit distributions only; no relevance of loss carryforwards 
ES (2000-2014): regulation only applies to inactive companies. 
LV (2018):  taxation of profit distributions only; no relevance of loss carryforwards 
NL (2000): regulation only applies to inactive companies. 
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Figure 5: Development of categories over time 
 
The general trend shows a movement towards the cumulative system (Figure 5). From 2000 to 
2018, the amount of EU28 Member States employing this type of regulation doubled from 
seven to 14 countries. Where existing restrictions were in place they were changed (three coun-
tries), and if new restrictions were introduced, they usually incorporate a combination of the 
activity and ownership criteria (four countries). This potentially benefits start-ups as it de-
creases the risk of forfeitures of loss carryforwards. 
Nevertheless, some countries still employ rather restrictive regulations. Even though exemp-
tions mitigate concerns that they will negatively affect the environment for young, innovative 
corporations, the restrictions still entail risks and administrative burdens. If they indeed exert a 
negative influence on the funding and development of start-ups, this could impact the location 
decision of founders and thus the local start-up environment. Whether and to what extent this 
effect is present remains an empirical question 
7. Summary 
(1) The majority of the European Member States have anti-loss trafficking restrictions in 
place to counter the acquisition of companies for no other purpose than the transfer of tax 
loss carryforwards. The restrictions rely on a change in ownership, a change in activity, 
or both as condition to assume abusive transactions. However, acquisitions or public of-
ferings of start-ups with accumulated losses can unintentionally be affected as well. The 
specific design of the regulation shows great heterogeneity across countries, with differ-
ing definition of ownership and activity, thresholds and special exemptions.  
(2) Arguments against the trafficking of loss carryforwards are based on the notion that losses 
should be tied to a person or activity, or the principle of tax neutrality. However, the 
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restrictions only affect corporations. Denying the transfer of losses prevents investors 
from recouping their unsuccessful investments, thus increasing their risk when investing 
in incorporated entities as compared to partnerships. 
(3) European SMEs account for a considerable part of the economic activity and employment. 
Young and innovative companies are considered the driver of a country’s technological 
and economic progress. Impairing the start-up environment thus could have adverse ef-
fects on growth and innovation in the EU. Investors and companies incorporate limita-
tions on the amount and timing of loss carryforwards and carrybacks into their decision 
making. Empirical findings indicate that temporal tax loss restrictions disproportionally 
affect SMEs and start-ups. Similarly, anti-abuse regulations have been argued to impair 
the funding and development of start-ups if accumulated loss carryforwards have to be 
forfeited after an increase in capital, the entry of a new investor or an IPO.   
(4) This study provides an overview over the restrictions on the transfer of loss carryforwards 
in the EU28 Member States from 2000 to 2018. A classification scheme is suggested 
based on the strictness of the regulation, ranging from the absence of specific restrictions 
to the forced forfeiture of loss carryforwards in the case of a change in ownership or a 
change in activity. This index can serve as guidance for policy makers and investors, 
providing an overview over different designs and their development as well as a compar-
ison across the EU28 Member States. 
(5) The majority of countries introduced or changed to a regime with the cumulative require-
ment of a change in ownership and a change in activity. On the one hand, more countries 
employ specific restrictions compared to 2000. On the other hand, regulations became 
more lenient over time, decreasing the risk for start-ups to get caught up in the anti-abuse 
regulations. Empirical research is needed in order to determine whether the restrictions 
exert a significant negative influence on start-up funding as well as their activities and 
location decisions, or whether the exemptions mitigate these risks. 
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Appendix 
Coun-
try 
Intro-
duction 
Law Period 
Ownership Activity Excemption 
Type 
Percent-
age 
Level of 
change 
Capital 
increase 
Criteria Quoted Group 
Reco
-very 
Hidden 
Reserves 
Evi-
dence 
AT 1988 
8 (4) c) 
KStG 
2000-
2018 
voting 75%3 direct - 
nature or 
conduct, assets 
- - x x - 
BE 1997 
207 (3) 
ITC 
2000-
2018 
voting control 
direct or 
indirect 
- - - - - - x 
BG 1998 
119 (2) 
CITA 
2000-
2018 
equity 50% direct - - - - - - - 
CY ? 
13 (1), 
(2) 
2000-
2018 
equity 50% direct - 
nature or 
conduct 
- x - - - 
CZ - - 
1998-
2003 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 2004 
38na (1) 
- (3) 
2004-
2018 
equity, voting 25% direct - income - - - - - 
DE 1990 
8 (4) 
KStG 
2000-
2007 
equity, voting, 
dividends 
50% direct x4 assets - - x - - 
  8c KStG 
2008-
2009 
equity, voting, 
dividends 
25%-
50% 
direct or 
indirect 
x - - - x5 - - 
  8c KStG 
2010-
2015 
equity, voting, 
dividends 
25%-
50% 
direct or 
indirect 
x - - x x x - 
                                                            
3 Not legally codified, but adminstrative practice. 
4 Not legally codified, but adminstrative practice. 
5 Introduction in 2010, retroacive application. 
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8c, 8d 
KStG 
2016-
2018 
equity, voting, 
dividends 
25%-
50% 
direct or 
indirect 
x 
product portfo-
lio, establish-
ments, sales 
markets 
- x x x - 
DK 1988 
15 (7)-
(9) LL / 
12 D 
SEL 
2000-
2018 
equity, voting 50% 
parent le-
vel 
- - x x - - - 
EE - - 
2000-
2018 
distribution tax, no LCF available 
ES 1996 25 
2000-
2014 
equity, divi-
dends 
majority 
direct or 
indirect 
- -6 - - - - - 
  
26 (4) / 
43 (2) 
ISS 
2015-
2018 
equity, divi-
dends 
majority 
direct or 
indirect 
- turnover - - - - - 
FI 1993 
122 (1) 
EVL 
2000-
2018 
equity 50% 
direct or 
indirect 
x - x7 x8 x9 - x10 
FR 1985 
221 (5) 
CGI 
2000-
2018 
- - - - 
turnover, 
employees, as-
sets 
- - - x - 
GB 1988 
Part 14 
CTA 
2000-
2018 
equity 50% 
direct or 
indirect 
- 
product portfo-
lio, establish-
ments, sales 
markets 
- x - - - 
GR - - 
2000-
2013 
- - - - - - - - - - 
                                                            
6 Regulation only applies if company has been inactive before. 
7 Not legally codified, but adminstrative practice. 
8 Not legally codified, but adminstrative practice. 
9 Not legally codified, but adminstrative practice. 
10 Not legally codified, but adminstrative practice. 
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 2014 
27 (5) 
NITC 
2014-
2018 
equity, voting 33% 
direct or 
indirect 
- turnover11  - - - - 
HU 1997 ? 2000 equity 50% direct - - - - - - - 
 - - 
2001-
2011 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 2012 17 (9) 
2012-
2018 
equity majority 
direct or 
indirect 
- 
product portfo-
lio, establish-
ments, sales 
markets 
x - - - - 
HR - - 
2000-
2009 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 2010 
17 (5) - 
(8) 
2010-
2018 
equity 50% direct - activity - - x - - 
IE 1976 
27 CTA 
1976, 
401 
TCA 
1997 
2000-
2018 
equity, voting 
substan-
tial 
direct - 
product portfo-
lio, establish-
ments, sales 
markets 
- x - - - 
IT 1998 
84 
TUIR 
2000-
2018 
voting majority direct - activity - x - - - 
LT - - 
2000-
2001 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 2002 
43 (2), 
(3) 
2002-
2006 
equity 66% direct - activity - - - - - 
  43 
2007-
2018 
equity control direct - activity - - - - - 
LU - - 
2000-
2018 
- - - - - - - - - - 
LV 1995 
14 (2), 
(3) 
2000-
2017 
equity, voting 50% 
direct or 
indirect 
- turnover - - - - - 
 - - 2018 distribution tax, no LCF available 
                                                            
11 Introduction in 2018, retroactive application. 
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MT - - 
2000-
2018 
- - - - - - - - - - 
NL 1970 
20 (5)  
VpB 
2000 equity 
substan-
tial 
direct or 
indirect 
- -12 - x - x13 - 
  
20a 
VpB 
2001-
2018 
equity 30% 
direct or 
indirect 
x14 
employees, 
turnover, as-
sets 
x x - x - 
PL - - 
1998-
2018 
- - - - - - - - - - 
PT 1995 
47 (8) 
CTC 
2000-
2005 
- - - - activity - - - - x 
  
47 (8), 
52 (8) 
CTC 
2006-
2018 
equity, voting 50% direct - activity15 - - - - x 
RO - - 
2000-
2018 
- - - - - - - - - - 
SE 1983 40 IL 
2000-
2018 
equity control 
parent le-
vel 
x - - x - x x 
SI - - 
2000-
2004 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 2005 
29 (5) 
ZDDPO
-1 
2005-
2006 
equity, voting 25% 
direct or 
indirect 
- - - - - - - 
  
36 (5) 
ZDDPO
-2 
2007-
2018 
equity, voting 50% 
direct or 
indirect 
- activity - - x - - 
SK - - 
2000-
2018 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
                                                            
12 Only applies to companies that have reduced or terminated activity before the change in ownership. 
13 Not legally codified, but practice based on court decisions. 
14 Applies if participation was below 33% before capital increase. 
15 Requirement not cumulative. The fulfillment of each criteria on its own triggers the regulation. 
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